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Mandatory pension systems play a major role in 
individual savings and labor supply decisions. In 
particular, it is well known that defined benefit pension 
schemes, which are not actuarially fair, can create 
incentives for early retirement and therefore reduce labor 
supply and the stock of human capital in a given country.  
This is an important policy issue in middle-income 
countries, with still low participation rates in the labor 
force, where the “window” opened by the demographic 
transition is already closed or will close in the near future.   
In these countries, policies to stimulate private sector 
growth, competitiveness, and employment creation 
should be accompanied by policies that increase labor 
force participation, raising the ratio of active to inactive 
population and therefore the potential for higher income 
per capita growth. 
   Unfortunately, the analytical tools developed to assess 
pension reform options tend to focus on the financial 
sustainability of the schemes and the adequacy of 
benefits.  Little attention is given in practice to the social 
costs imposed by distortions on the supply of labor.  In 
part, this is given by the lack of analytical tools that, in 
the context of limited information regarding individual 
This paper—a product of the Human Development Group in the Middle East and North Africa Region (MNSHD)—is 
part of a larger effort in the department to better understand the labor market implications of pension reforms and 
amendments to the social insurance package in general. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at 
http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at abodor@worldbank.org, drobalino@worldbank.org and 
mrutkowski@worldbank.org respectively. 
preferences and behavior, can be used to assess the 
magnitude of these distortions.  This paper develops 
methodologies that can bridge the gap between economic 
theory and the practices of pension policy personnel 
under conditions of deep uncertainty regarding the 
variables driving individual behavioral responses to policy 
changes.  First, the paper develops an indicator to predict 
the age-specific retirement probabilities induced by a 
particular pension system, given heterogeneous individual 
preferences over risk, consumption, and leisure.  The 
paper then describes how this indicator can be used to 
project the size of the labor force by gender, age and 
skill level and therefore the dynamics of human capital 
accumulation.  The integration of these two analytical 
tools allow us to show the impact of a particular pension 
reform proposals on the dynamics of labor supply, human 
capital and, given the dynamics of capital and total 
factor productivity, economic growth.  Furthermore, 
the paper develops a set of life-cycle income measures 
for typical individual paths that allow us to measure 
the contribution of segmented pension schemes to the 
segmentation of the labor market.  The methods are 
applied to the case of Morocco. 
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Defined benefit (DB) pension systems, usually financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, often 
embed bad microeconomic design features that create distortions in savings and labor 
demand/supply decisions.  This paper focuses on two that are relevant from the point of 
view of labor markets:  (i) incentives to retire early; and (ii) institutional fragmentation.  
None of these features is inherently built into a DB system, but the fact is that an 
overwhelming majority worldwide offer incentives to retire early and are split into 
separate subsystems for different professional groups, typically civil servants, military 
and private sector workers, and leaving behind uncovered workers.  The contribution of 
this paper is to develop analytical tools that can be used to assess the magnitude of these 
distortions, particularly in the presence of limited data, and conduct ex-ante assessments 
of the impacts of alternative reforms. 
 
Incentives to retire early take effect through various design features of DB systems, but 
the bottom line is the same in each of the distortionary DB design components: they do 
not allow for an actuarial relationship between social security contributions and pensions. 
In fact, an additional year of work typically does not yield corresponding growth in 
benefits, so workers have a tendency to retire at the earliest possible moment.  
 
Most of the research on the impact of incentives for early retirement has been 
concentrating on OECD countries that have experienced steady drops in retirement ages 
despite substantial increases in longevity throughout the 20
th century. Most recently, the 
international research project conducted in twelve OECD countries using the same 
methodology (Gruber and Wise, 1999, 2004 and forthcoming) found that the great 
majority of social security systems in these countries provide incentives to leave the labor 
force at early ages and that there is a strong relationship between these incentives and the 
withdrawal of older workers from the labor force.  In addition, Hertbersson and Orszag 
(2003) have estimated that early retirement provisions in the OECD countries cost on 
average 7.5% of potential annual OECD output. They also showed that the distortions 
created by early retirement can be further accentuated by the aging of the population. For 
example, they estimated that male labor force participation in OECD countries would 
have to rise from 66% to 70% (from 2003 to 2010) to keep the costs of early retirement at 
the 2003 level in 2010.  More generally, it has been suggested that eliminating incentives 
for early retirement is an important policy intervention to mitigate the macroeconomic 
impact of a shrinking labor force as the population ages (see Oliveira Martins et al., 
2005).  The evidence from OECD countries also shows that cutting down on early 
retirement incentives through reform of social security systems can have an important 
effect on labor force participation and positive fiscal implications from two sources: (1) 
  2reduced required fiscal support from resulting increase in financial health of programs 
and (2) increased government tax revenues. Financial implications for program costs are 
very large (20 to 40% of current program costs) and countries can save as much as 1% of 
GDP in government revenues engendered by changes in the labor force participation of 
older workers.  
 
The fragmentation of the pension system institutional organization is another source of 
labor market distortions.  Fragmentation is explained by the emergence of occupational 
pension schemes that preceded the development of mandatory government pension 
schemes. The pension schemes that governments developed often deepened the 
fragmentation. Indeed, in certain societies the pension schemes of certain occupations 
(e.g. public servants) offer a significant portion of the total employee compensation 
package.  This fragmentation is a significant source of economic inefficiency in several 
cases. Beyond the argument based on the economies of scale regarding the administration 
costs we see that the lack of (or limited) portability of pension rights across pension 
schemes effectively serves as a labor market friction. The labor market is the “place” 
where the dynamic matching process of physical capital and labor happens. Any 
administrative rule that prevents the occurrence of productive matches, or that does not 
allow the separation of matches that can be dominated in efficiency by another labor-
capital match, ultimately causes economic inefficiency and does not allow the full 
utilization of the gains from trade. 
2
 
The lack of portability of pension rights makes the price of separation in potentially 
inefficient matches too high for the separation to happen. The different rates of returns 
the various pension schemes offer on contributions distort the role of the wages as the 
system informing about the price/value of labor effort. High indirect compensation 
through high internal rate of return (IRR) pension schemes create incentives for 
unemployed individuals to queue for jobs in the sector covered under the high IRR 
pension schemes. Fragmentation also creates incentives towards biased investment into 
human capital towards the skills applied in the sector covered by high IRR pension 
schemes. If the pension scheme with high IRR is offered towards government employees 
then the bias in skills development may undermine the skilled labor supply that the 
private sector needs for growth.  
 
These supply-side distortions in the labor market imply an inefficient allocation of labor 
and therefore of other economic resources and may have a significant adverse impact on 
GDP growth. Thus the need to asses the magnitude of the distortions and motivate policy 
reform emerges.  
 
The paper brings three specific methodological contributions to the analysis of supply 
side distortions.  First we develop an indicator to measure incentives for early retirement, 
which takes into account the trade-off between consumption and leisure even when the 
distribution of individual preferences over this trade-off and the preferences over risk 
aversion are not known.  We show that this indicator is superior to standard proxies used 
                                                 
2 For an extensive review of the ‘segmented labor markets (SLM)’ literature please see Taubman and 
Wachter (1986). 
  3to analyze incentives for early retirement, such as the slope of internal rates of return on 
contributions curve and the marginal change in pension wealth. Second, we develop a 
model that projects the skills composition of the labor force by age and gender and 
compute levels of human capital on the basis of standard wage equations.  The model is 
used to assess how changes in retirement probabilities, by age and gender, affect the 
dynamics of human capital accumulation and, through this channel, economic growth.  
Finally, we develop a methodology to assess how fragmented pension systems affect 
incentives to move across sectors and decisions about investments in education. To 
illustrate the use of the tools we take the case of Morocco.  Indeed, we consider Morocco 
a good representative of middle-income countries with badly designed and fragmented 
defined-benefit pay-as-you-go pension schemes.  Hence, our conclusions can be 
applicable for other middle-income and, to some extent, high-income countries.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. The next section (section 2) develops an indicator 
to measure incentives for early retirement.  The methodology to assess the economic 
costs of early retirement is presented and illustrated in Section 3.  Section 4 is concerned 
with the analysis of distortions related to investments in education and the mobility of the 
labor force.  Finally, Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. Measuring distortions in retirement decisions 
 
 
The standard indicators used to assess incentives for early retirement are the internal rate 
of return (IRR) on contributions and the change in pension wealth at a given retirement 
age.
3  These indicators, however, have at least three major problems.  First, they do not 
capture the trade-offs between consumption and leisure, which are at the core of the 
retirement decision.  Second, they ignore the interplay between benefit formulas, 
eligibility conditions and individual attitudes towards risk.  Third, they would suggest the 
same retirement behavior to people with identical or similar career path whereas we 
observe heterogeneous retirement ages even for individuals who are similar or identical 
in their observable characteristic from the perspective of the pension system.  The 
implication is that any conclusion in terms of whether individuals have weak or strong 
incentives to delay retirement can be misleading.  In this section we propose a 
complementary indicator that takes the trade-off between consumption and leisure into 
account as well as the level of risk aversion of individuals.   
 
In the standard inter-temporal utility maximization problem individuals choose how 
much to save, how much to work, and when to retire.  Formally we have: 
 
                                                 
3 The internal rate of return on contributions is the rate that equates the present value of contributions with 
the present value of pensions.  It can be interpreted as the implicit interest rate that the pension system pays 
to plans members on their contributions.  The pension wealth, on the other hand, is the present value of 
expected future pensions. 
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where U(.) is the standard period utility function capturing the trade-off between 
consumption (c) and leisure (l), vt is the probability of survival to age t, ρ is the rate of 
time preference, y is income, w labor productivity, h total available working time at time 
t, s the savings rate, R the retirement age, X is the maximum number of years an 
individual can live and ‘a’ is the entry age to the labor market.  The function P(.) gives 
the value of retirement income, which depends on past savings, wages, interest rates, as 
well as policy parameters θ (i.e. the type of pension system). 
  
Ideally, one would like to solve a system such as (1) for every member in a given pension 
plan and determine the distribution of optimal retirement ages, which would depend on 
individual characteristics that affect the shape of the utility function, their productivity, 
and their survival probabilities.  One could then assess how changes in policy parameters 
would affect retirement patterns and assess the associated economic costs/benefits.  This, 
of course, is not possible, mainly because usually there are no data that would allow an 
estimation of individual utility functions.
4  Some could also argue whether a model such 
as (1) really captures individual behaviors. 
 
Nonetheless, we argue that from a normative point of view, a simplified version of 
system (1) estimated for a sample of imaginary plan members, can provide useful 
information about the level of distortions that the pension system creates and that affect 
retirement decisions.  The simplified version that we propose only focuses on the 
retirement decisions, taking the savings rate and labor supply as given.  It fixes the 
savings rate equal to the contribution rate (during retirement consumption is equal to the 
pension) and sets labor supply equal to 260/365 – 260 is the total number of working 
days in a year.  So a retired individual would have leisure equal to 1 while a working 
individual would have leisure equal to (365-260)/365.  It further assumes a period utility 
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4 Notice that simply observing who retires and who does not is not sufficient to analyze the true incentive 
structure since one does not have a counterfactual.  For the same reason statistical inference about 
behavioral responses to pension policy changes is extremely limited based on data on observed retirement 
patterns as typically no variation of the pension system policy parameters is associated with observed data. 
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 where α captures trade-off between consumption and leisure and λ is the coefficient of 
risk aversion.  This concept of utility seems abstract but in practice it is simply a way to 
introduce a non-linear link between changes in the levels of consumption and leisure and 
the value/happiness derived from them.  The “curvature” of the utility function with 
respect to the combined consumption-leisure argument is affected by the coefficient of 
risk aversion.  The higher this coefficient the higher the curvature.  The essence of risk 
aversion is that risk averse individuals value a level of consumption c1 with 100% 
probability more than a level of consumption c2 that is realized with a probability 
p∈[0,1] if c1=c2*p+0*(1-p), i.e. the expected value of consumption is identical in both 
cases.   
 
Given the utility function, a given assumption for the path of wages, and the parameters 
of the pension system, it is possible to calculate the optimal retirement age as a function 
of the parameters α and λ.
5  The optimal retirement age would be the age where the 
marginal benefit of delaying retirement to one year later falls below the marginal costs -- 
all measured in utility terms.  The benefits are, presumably, a higher pension, a higher 
consumption path, and consequently a higher consumption component of the expected 
utility calculation.  The cost is delaying the increase in the level of leisure.   
 
Formally, the net gain at age R of delaying retirement by one year is as follows: 
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where wi is the wage received by the individual at age ‘i‘ and τ is the contribution rate.  
So individuals will delay retirement as long as ngu(R) >0.
6  
 
Clearly, one does not know the joint distributions of the parameters α and λ within the 
population of plan members. This is a case of decision-making under conditions of deep 
uncertainty.  One solution is to explore a large number of combinations assuming that the 
parameters are uniformly distributed within their supports. By doing so it is possible to 
derive a map of functions ngu(R; α,λ) that, we argue, provides a unique characterization 
of the pension system and informs about the magnitude of possible incentive problems.  
In addition, one can compute a summary indicator that gives the percentage of cases 
where the optimal retirement age is below a given threshold.  In fact, as this indicator 
could be calculated at all possible retirement ages, the entire age profile of retirement can 
be generated in association with the given pension system rules and parameters. 
                                                 
5 The implicit assumption here is that the distribution of individual retirement ages can be generated using a 
sample of imaginary individuals who are heterogeneous in their preference parameters, but they all earn the 
same representative income. Admittedly, this is a strong assumption. In following stages of this research 
project an additional dimension, income heterogeneity, will be added to the model to eliminate this 
assumption. 
6 The decision rule that relies on the sign change of ngu(.) assumes that ngu() is monotonically decreasing. 
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We next apply these indicators to the three mandatory pension schemes in Morocco. The 
CNSS (Conseil National de S’ecurit’e Social) is the scheme for private sector workers.  
The CMR (Caisse Marocaine de Retraites) is the acronym for the civil servant pension 
scheme.  Other public sector workers enroll in the RCAR (Régime Collectif d´Assurance 
et de Retraites).  We compare our indicator to the standard measures the IRR and the 
pension wealth.   
 
In Morocco the standard measures, the IRR and the pension wealth, indicate the existence 
of incentives problems.  The IRR is downward slopping for the CNSS and the CMR, 
suggesting that individuals “receive less” on their contributions if they delay retirement 
(see Figure 1).  For example, an individual retiring at age 55 from the CNSS would 
receive an implicit real rate of return on contributions of 5% while an individual retiring 
at age 60 would receive only 4%.  This occurs because the accrual rate is not adjusted as 
a function of the retirement age to correctly take into account that individuals retiring 
earlier, and therefore contributing for shorter and receiving pensions for longer periods, 
should also get lower pensions.  The RCAR in Morocco does adjust the accrual rate 
approximately this way.  In fact, the adjustments are such that the IRR increases when 
individuals delay retirement.  Hence, one would like to conclude that in the case of the 
RCAR there are positive incentives to delay retirement.  How strong are they? 
 





















The IRRs are for men with a salary equal to average earnings, who join the system at age 
25 and contribute continuously until retirement.  Real wages are assumed to grow at 3%. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
A more accurate picture of the situation is given by the change in the net pension wealth 
occurring as a result of a delay in the retirement decision.  Similarly to the gain in utility 
defined in equation (3), the change in net pension wealth resulting from delaying 
retirement from age j to age j+1 is given by: 
 
j j j PW PW w j j gpw − + − = + > − + ρ τ 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 (    (4) 
 
where PWi is the value of the pension wealth retiring at age i. 
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According to this measure, in the case of Morocco, none of the pension funds provide 
true incentives for delayed retirement.  Changes in pension wealth are negative for all 
retirement ages (see Figure 2).  Even for the RCAR, the results suggest that current 
adjustments to the accrual rate would not be sufficient to motivate individuals to delay 
retirement.  The CMR is a peculiar case.  The system provides strong incentives to 
individuals who are 59 years old to delay retirement by one year.  This is because at age 
60 the accrual rate increases to 2.5% from 2% for all previous years of service. 
 




























































































Same assumptions as for Figure 1.  In addition, the discount rate used for present value calculations 
is set at 2%. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
 
In practice, however, we do observe that in all pension funds individuals retire at various 
retirement ages.  The question is really in which pension fund the incentives for early 
retirement are stronger.  It is here where the maps ngu(R,α,λ) of each of the pension 
funds become helpful.  These maps were calculated under the assumption that wages 
grow in real terms at 3% per year and the rate of time preference ρ is 0.98 annually.  One 
hundred combinations of the parameters α and λ were used:  α ∈ [0.2,0.7] and λ ∈ 
[0.5,5].  The results are presented in Figure 3.  
 
The map for each fund is very different and characterizes the benefit formulas and 
eligibility conditions in a unique way.  Each “line” within the map is associated with a 
given combination of the parameters α and λ.  In all funds, the lines can be grouped into 
three categories.  First, lines which are always below the horizontal axis.  These are 
associated with utility functions that never generate incentives to delay retirement.  The 
gain in expected utility from delaying retirement is always negative and individuals retire 
as soon as possible – in our example at age 55.  The second type of lines involves lines 
that are always above the horizontal axis indicating that the gains from delaying 
retirement are always positive.  These lines correspond to individuals who never have 
incentives to retire in the period of analysis (they could retire afterwards).  Finally, there 
are lines which cross the horizontal axis.  The more relevant are the ones that cross the 
  8axis from above.  In this case, the point of crossing gives the optimal retirement age.
7   
 
In the case of the CNSS the majority of lines are either above or below the horizontal 
axis.  So in the CNSS individuals with a certain propensity for retirement will most likely 
retire as soon as possible.  In the CMR the majority of lines start below the horizontal 
axis, cross the line from below and then cross the axis again from above.  Hence for 
individuals it is optimal to retire as soon as possible up to age 58.  At age 59 it is better to 
wait one more year.  The distorted map that emerges reflects the peculiarity of the benefit 
formula based on final wages where the accrual rate increases from 2% to 2.5% at age 60.  
The map of the RCAR corresponds to a system that is more actuarially fair. A majority of 
individuals will not retire immediately regardless of their propensity to do so.  This is 
because of the upward slopping IRR function.   
 
Figure 3: Utility Maps for the Retirement Decision 
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Source:  Authors’ calculations.   
 
 
The information captured in the maps can be summarized by the probability of early 
retirement, defined here as the probability of retiring at age 55.  As suggested by the 
charts, the probability of early retirement is highest in the CNSS.  In that case, for 40% of 
the individual preference parameter pairs the optimal retirement age is age 55.  For the 
CMR the probability of early retirement is somewhat lower (36%).  As previously 
indicated, the lowest probability of early retirement corresponds to the RCAR (17%). So 
                                                 
7 The discussion here is simplified so not all the special cases of the nonmonotone ngu(.) lines with 
multiple intersections with the horizontal axis are not discussed here; however, the behavioral 
consequences can be easily determined using the same framework for these individuals as well. 
  9even if the pension wealth indicator suggested a lack of incentives for delayed retirement, 
in reality, most probable, the RCAR does encourage retirement at higher ages – which is 
also consistent with the slope of the IRR function.   
 
Figure 4:  Normative Probability of Early Retirement 




Normative probability of retirement at age 55
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
In conclusion, the utility maps and the normative estimator of the probability of early 
retirement provide more precise information about the incentives to retire early, given 
individuals with heterogeneous preferences.  The slope of the IRR function and the 
change in pension wealth are useful to flag distortions, but one needs to be careful when 
deriving conclusions on actual retirement behavior based on these overly simplified 
measures.  This is because these two indicators do not take into account the trade-off 
between consumption and leisure and the level of risk aversion of individuals.  Another 
attractive feature of the proposed indicator is that the calculations are simple.  Therefore, 
future assessments of pension institutions and international comparisons of the effects of 
benefit formulas and eligibility conditions on retirement decisions could benefit from the 
proposed calculations.  Finally, the indicator is useful to assess, ex-ante, the potential 
impact that policy changes can have on retirement decisions.  As discussed in the next 
section, these decisions affect the level of human capital of a given country and therefore 
its growth potential. 
 
 
3. Estimating the cost of early retirement in terms of the loss of productive 
capacities of the economy 
 
 
As discussed in the previous section, from the individual’s point of view the decision to 
retire is a choice that reflects preferences between leisure and consumption.  From the 
point of view of the country, however, retirement represents a loss of human capital, 
particularly when it occurs at early ages.  Standard analyses in pension policy focus on 
the fiscal costs of early retirement.  Here we argue that the economic cost of early 
retirement should be also taken into account.  Hence, this section develops a 
methodology to assess the impact that a pension system can have on human capital 
  10accumulation and economic growth, by influencing retirement decisions
8 and therefore 
labor force participation rates for individuals with different skill levels.
 9    
 
 
The model – from skill formation to human capital 
 
The model developed here projects the labor force by gender, age and education level. 
Assuming a competitive environment we characterize the human capital of individuals 
with the marginal product of their labor, an equivalent value to their wages if they are 
employed.  These are approximated by standard wage functions which we describe in the 
next section.
10  Clearly this definition of human capital may be counterintuitive to some 
as total human capital, a stock accumulated through a long period, is practically 
represented by the total wage bill under full employment of the labor force, i.e. the share 
of economic output attributable to labor effort during a year, a short period compared to 
the overall timeframe of human capital accumulation.   
 
The fist step is to project the total population by age and gender on the basis of 
expectations about future fertility and mortality rates.  Hence a vector Pop(g,a,t) is 
computed where g=1 if male and g=2 if female, ‘a’ refers to age and ‘t’ refers to the time 
period. 
 
The next step is to project the supply of skills by the education sector.  This supply is 
characterized by the vector Skill(s,g,a,e,t) where s=1 refers to “enrolled in an institution 
of the education system”, s=2 refers to those who are “not enrolled in the system of 
education”, while e∈{no education, 1st year of primary education, 2nd year of primary 
education, …} is an element of the complete set of educational attainment categories. A 
particular type of school constitutes as many distinct educational attainment categories as 
many years are necessary to successfully complete its curriculum.  
 
Entry to primary education is projected as follows: 
 
[ ) , 6 , ( 1 * ) , 6 , ( ) , , 6 , , 2 (
) , 6 , ( * ) , 6 , ( ) , 1 , 6 , , 1 (
t a g SR t a g Pop t NoEd e a g s Skill
t a g SR t a g Pop t P e a g s Skill
= − = = = = = ]
= = = = = =
,   (5) 
 
where SR(g, a=6, t) is the scholarization rate at the mandatory primary education entry 
age. (P1 refers to “1st year of primary education”, NoEd refers to “no education”.) Those 
who do not enter primary education are registered as “out of school” population without 
education. 
                                                 
8  The model could be used as well to assess the economic impact of the effect of the pension system on the 
age of entrance to the formal labor market.   
9 In this paper the term human capital is used for the human capital actually offered for work, i.e. the 
human capital stock does not include the potentially highly productive, but inactive population. 
10 The empirical analysis of the household survey presented in the following section includes the economic 
sector in the set of explanatory variables in determining wages. Since the labor force projection does not 
have a sector dimension the specification of the wage equation is somewhat simplified here, i.e. it omits 
economic sector from the set of right hand side variables. 
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Based on the time series on education enrollment stocks, advancement rates, repetition 
rates and drop-out rates an E x (E+1) skills development transition matrix (TR) is 
generated, where E is the number of distinct educational attainment categories. TR(e1, 
e2) is the probability of “advancing” from education category e1 to education category 
e2. In the special case when e1= e2 TR(e1, e2) refers to repetition probability.
11 TR(e1, 
E+1) is defined as the probability of successfully completing educational level e1 and 
leaving the education system after the successful completion. So how does the model 
follow educational attainment in the society? A particular education level ‘e’ can be 
reached in one of the following ways. First we cover the case of advancement (and 
repetition) within the education system. 
 
[] ) 6 ( ) , ( * ) 1 , , 1 , , 1 ( * ) 1 , 1 , ( 1 ] , , , , 1 (
1 ∑
=
− − = − − − = = Δ
E
i
e i TR t i a g s Skill t a g Mort t e a g s Skill
 
where Mort(g,a,t) is the gender and time specific mortality probability of dying in the 
period when reaching age ‘a’ conditional on surviving through the previous period. Note 
that the model is only concerned about net flows. Beyond the age of entering primary 
education the net flows are always within and from (never to) the education system. 
 
Those who finish successfully their intended level of education are transitioned out the 
school system according to the following equation: 
 
[] ) 7 ( ) 1 , ( * ) 1 , , 1 , , 1 ( * ) 1 , 1 , ( 1 ) , , , , 2 ( + − − = − − − = = Δ E e TR t e a g s Skill t a g Mort t e a g s Skill
 
The probability of dropping is the difference between 1 and the sum of the elements in a 
given row of the transition matrix.  We have: 
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The evolution of those who already left the education system is according to the 
following equation: 
 
[] ) 1 , , 1 , , 2 ( * ) 1 , 1 , ( 1 ) , , , , 2 ( − − = − − − = = Δ t e a g s Skill t a g Mort t e a g s Skill  (9) 
 
The potential labor supply is given by those who are out of the education system, 
however, only the applicable labor force participation rates allow us to calculate the 
portion of the potential labor force that actually contributes to the human capital stock: 
 
                                                 
11 Note that this formulation assumes that the transition probabilities only depend on the “to” and “from” 
education categories, and independent of gender, age and time. The reason why we do not present a more 
general formulation is that we assumed an only 2 dimensional transition array in the quantitative example 
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where LF is the labor force array and LFPR is the labor force participation array.
12
 
Now, we are ready to turn the LF array into a measure of human capital. Recall that we 
can predict the individual human capital value for all combinations of gender, age and 
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In this paper we infer changes in retirement probabilities by age, by looking at changes in 
participation rates.
13   Hence, we can compare the dynamics of human capital under the 
status-quo with the dynamics of human capital in the case where participation rates 
change as a result of changes in pension benefit formulas and eligibility conditions.   
 
Admittedly, there are limitations in the proposed analysis. First, the choice of the measure 
of human capital only considers the supply side of the labor market, i.e. implicitly 
assumes that those who enter the labor force will actually get a job and thus become a 
part of the (productive) human capital stock.  Hence, our projections really constitute an 
analysis of potential human capital.  In addition, the individual productivity values that 
we derive are associated with the interaction of labor supply and demand at a given point 
in time, and then we assume that this interaction is applicable to the future.  Note that the 
productivity of a given unit of human capital can change as a result of technological 
progress.  Our estimates of human capital should therefore be considered as a lower 
bound.  
 
Quantitative example: the case of Morocco 
 
We illustrate the use of the model in the case of Morocco.  Figure 5 illustrates the 
dynamics of population growth and the skills composition of the labor force as projected 
                                                 
12 In practice we had to make certain homogeneity assumption in the case of the labor force participation 
rate array since the level of the disaggregation of the available data along the educational attainment 
dimension was insufficient. The ILO publishes age and gender specific labor force participation rate 
projections for the various countries in the LABORSTA database. 
13 The model could be easily extended to projecting the age and gender distribution of the population 
divided into 3 categories: “in school”, “retired”, “potential labor force”. This formulation would allow that 
the changes in labor force participation induced by changes in the pension system enter the model through 
the changes in the gender and age specific retirement probabilities. The choice of formulation depends on 
the application, in particular, whether it is easier to assess the impact of the changes induced by the pension 
system in terms of retirement probabilities or labor force participation rates.  
  13in the baseline scenario for Morocco. The question that we ask is how changes in 
participation rates – induced by changes in retirement probabilities – would affect these 
baseline dynamics.   
 
 





































Source:  ILO Authors’ calculation. 
 
 
The right panel of Figure 6 illustrates that male labor force participation rates are high 
across the board including ages potentially affected by early retirement (that is prior to 
age 60, which is the “standard” retirement age). The male labor force participation rate 
for the 59 year-old age cohort is 84.3 percent suggesting that the role of men in income 
generation for the family dominates the incentives exerted by the early retirement rules of 
the pension system, i.e. there does not seem to be room for further increasing male 
activity rates through changing early retirement rules.
14 In fact, projected male activity is 
expected to shrink. The range of labor force participation rates of 51-59 year-old men is 
expected to move from 84.3%-95.7% to 74.7%-94.3% by 2040. In contrast, female labor 
force participation rates are low across the board and steeply decreasing during ages 51 to 
59 from 28.7% to 16.1%. While female activity is expected to increase, the steeply 
decreasing activity prior to age 60 is expected to persist (e.g. in 2040 48.8% of 51 year 
old women are expected to be employed or seeking employment, while only 35.3% of the 
59 year-old women is expected to belong to the labor force).
15 In general, it appears that 
the preference maps shown in the previous section are consistent with the observed labor 
force participation of women. 
 
                                                 
14 Note that the age specific labor force participation rates of the total population of Morocco are not 
identical to that of the consolidated membership of the 3 pension schemes introduced earlier. Those 
working in the informal sector are not covered under any of the schemes. In fact, it is possible that some 
people take advantage of the generous early retirement rules in one of the formal systems they belong to, 
and then offer labor services in the informal sector. These people are pensioners from the point of view of 
the pension scheme, and they are active in the view of national labor force participation estimates. 
15 We do not address labor force participation patterns beyond age 60 for two reasons: 1) early retirement 
rules are not applicable to this age group and only delayed retirement bonuses could affect the activity of 
these generations; 2) the dispersions of the state of individual health conditions are so large beyond 60 that 
retirement incentives cannot be effectively assessed without considering this constraint. 
  14Figure 6:   Age/Gender Specific Labor Force Participation Rates in 2005 and 2040 
























0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08
baseline  -  2005
baseline  -  2040
25%  LFPR 
increase  for 
ages  51-60
- 2040
ages  51-60 
LFPR  remain  at 
age  50  level
- 2040
25% LFPR  increase  
for ages  51-60  -  2005
ages  51-60  LFPR  remain  at 
age  50  level  -  2005
0
baseline - 2005




For females participation rates are assumed to deviate from the baseline due to changes in early retirement provisions  (see main text).   
Source:  ILO Laborsta Economically Active Population Estimates and Projections and authors’ calculations.
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We assess 5 possible scenarios for changing early retirement behavior and associated 
labor force participation as shown in Figure 6. Note that the labor force participation 
patterns here are selected for illustrative purposes, they do not reflect a particular 
expected behavioral response to a particular pension reform although the magnitude of 
the changes represented by the various scenarios are feasible if a high consolidated 
coverage of the pension schemes is assumed.  Recall that actual labor force participation 
behavioral responses associated with a particular pension reform can be estimated in a 
data rich environment using econometric methods or the tools described in the previous 
section of this paper could be applied in cases of data constraints.  The first scenario 
assumes that female labor participation patterns change immediately and the new labor 
force participation rates of women aged 51 to 60 are identical to that of the 50 year-old 
cohort. The second scenario is the same for women, but we also fix the male labor force 
participation rates at 2005 levels, and consequently we do not allow male participation 
rates to fall in this scenario. The third scenario assumes the same time invariant male 
activity rates at the 2005 level, but in this case female activity patterns do not change. 
Scenarios 4 and 5 increase the labor force participation rates of women aged 51 to 60 by 
25% immediately without and with imposing time invariant male labor force 
participation rates respectively. 
 
We start by looking at the impact of the reforms on the contribution of each age group to 
the total level of human capital with and without changes in participation rates.  The 
human capital share of the 51-60 age group is expected to increase even without changes 
in the pension system rules. Not surprisingly, the share of human capital of the pre-
retirement age groups further increases with additional surges in their labor force 
participation. Figure 7 illustrates that the human capital share of the age group is 0.6-1.2 
percentage point larger over the already steady increase of the baseline represented by the 
horizontal axis in this view. Later we will see that keeping the activity of men high at 
current levels has a larger impact on the growth of the total human capital stock as this 
represents a labor force participation increase compared to the baseline in all the age 
                                                 
16 Gender and age group specific activity rate projections are available from the ILO until 2020, beyond 
that linear convergence assumed to the activity rates of the ILO aggregate category “more developed 
regions” reaching its level in 2075. 
  15cohorts of the gender that is currently dominant in the labor force. However, the deviation 
from the baseline with respect to the 51-60 aged population is driven by the increase in 
female labor force participation as the deviation of male labor force participation from 
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Source:  ILO Authors’ calculation. 
 
Figure 8 summarizes the ultimate results of this quantitative exercise. Recall that the 
major determinants of the evolution of human capital, i.e. population growth, skills 
development through education and the baseline labor force participation path determine 
a baseline increasing path of human capital. In the case of Morocco the annual rate of 
human capital growth stands at 3.56% in 2006 and this rate is expected to decrease to 
1.1% by 2040. 
 
The human capital growth rate would be higher than the baseline if corrected early 
retirement incentives convince a significantly higher ratio of those who are close to the 
standard retirement age to remain in the labor force. 
 
                                                 
17 Note that the human capital calculations underlying the results shown in this paper assume that the 
productivity of a man and a woman with identical age and educational attainment are identical. This seems 
to contradict the fact that the wage regression equation identifies gender as significant explanatory variable 
suggesting higher ceteris paribus human capital for men. Two possible explanations for the significance of 
the gender dummy is wage discrimination or that men are truly more productive than women after 
controlling for education and age. Our calculations assume that the wage differential is due to wage 
discrimination and consequently we associate identical human capital values for women and men with 
identical age and education. 
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Source:  Authors’ calculation based on ILO labor force participation projections. 
 
The message of this analysis is that increased labor force participation rates among 
women induced by corrected early retirement rules in the pension system can have a 
significant and measurable impact on the rate of accumulation of productive capacities of 
the economy. Because of low initial female labor force participation and contrasting high 
activity of men in Morocco, the increased participation of the pre-retirement age women 
has a limited impact on the total growth rate of human capital. The additional human 
capital growth that could be achieved through maintained labor force participation of men 
is approximately 2.5 times larger than the expected behavioral response of women to 
changing early retirement rules. On average, during the period 2006-2040, corrected early 
retirement incentives could increase the human capital growth rate by approximately 2 
percent.  This is a remarkable portion, 1/50
th of the total human capital accumulation 
growth rate, considering that this impact is typically disregarded in the policy analysis of 
the impact of pension reform.   
 
 
4. Pension system fragmentation and labor mobility 
 
 
This section illustrates the effects that a fragmented pension system can have on 
incentives to supply labor in a given sector as well the mobility of labor across sectors.  
The analysis is based on micro simulations of career paths for individuals with different 
levels of education working in different economic sectors – and therefore belonging to 
different pension plans.  In these simulations, wages are projected using a function 
similar to the one that was applied to compute human capital and estimated using 
household survey data. 
 
Formally, at time t, the wage of an individual of gender ‘s’, age ‘i’, education category 
‘e’, working in sector ‘j’ , expressed as a share of average earnings is given by: 
 
() ( ) ( )
2
2 1 0 0 ln exp , , , i i w j e i s w sej sej t β β β + + − =         (12) 
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where ‘s’, ‘i', ‘e’ are respectively the gender, age, and level of education of the individual 
and ‘j’ is the economic sector where he or she operates.  Hence the marginal effect that 
age (experience) has on wages depends on the characteristics of the individual and the 
economic sector.   
 
Given equation (12), for any given individual we can compute net income flows across 
life.  These are given by: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { } ( ) e i
t
a j i t w j e i s w P R w j e i s w R i e E j e i s nif θ τ , , , , 1 , , , 1 , , , , + − − =    
 (13) 
 
where R=1 if the individual is retired or R=0 otherwise, P(.) is the function returning the 
pension of the individual as a function of policy parameters of the relevant pension 
system in the sector, and E(e,i) is a function that is equal to one if an individual that will 
achieve education level ‘e’ is out of school at age ‘i' or zero otherwise.   Also for 
simplicity we set the initial age and the initial time at 1 so ‘t’ and ‘i' are substitutes.  
 
Using (13) we can compute internal rates of return to marginal investments in education.  
The internal rate of return r
*(s,i,e,j) of moving from education level ‘e’ to education level 
e+1 is characterized by: 
 
() ( ) () ( () 0 , 1 , , 1 , , , , 1 , ,
*
1






v j e e s r j e i s nif j e i s nif )       (14) 
 
Finally, we can compute the expected net gain of taking a job in sector ‘j’ at time ‘t’, or 
waiting to take a job in sector j′ at time t+1 with probability p(j’).  This is given by: 
 
() ( ) ( ) [] () () ( ) [] () () [] ()() ∑
=
−








i t t r b j e k s nif j e t s nif PV j e t s nif PV j p j e t s nif PV j p j j e i s ngw ) 1 ( , , , , , , , , , ' 1 ' , , , ' ´ , , , , 1 1    
 (15) 
where PV[] is the present value function. The last term in equation (15) is used to take 
into account that an individual who continually delays taking the job in sector ‘j’ might 
have to accumulate some level of debt to finance its consumption (the parameter ‘a’ gives 
the age when the individual is first offered the job in sector j′).  Here the assumption is 
that the individual borrows a fraction ‘b’ of the net income flow that he or she would 
have achieved by taking the job in sector ‘j’. 
 
We apply this framework to the case of Morocco.  Equation (12) was estimated by simple 
OLS using the 1998 household survey for Morocco.  We defined 10 levels of education 
for the purposes of the analysis.  In addition we consider four economic sectors:  private, 
formal non-agricultural sector, the public sector, and the agricultural/informal sectors.  In 
the analysis we constructed 120 career paths.  These paths cross 10 levels of education, 
with four economic sectors, and with three types of pension funds.  As before, in all 
cases, the growth rate of real average earnings is set at 3% per year and the discount rate 
is 4%.  
  18 
The results show marked differences in the dynamics of wages across education levels.  
The left panel of Figure 9 shows the career path of three individuals who work in the 
private sector.  One has no education, the other has only secondary education and the 
third one has higher education.  Not surprisingly, for the individual with no education the 
wage curve starts at a lower level and is also flatter.  The various career paths also show 
that individuals working in the public sector, regardless of the level of education, enjoy a 
better situation both in terms of wages and pensions (see right panel in Figure 9).  On the 
contrary, individuals working in the agricultural sector and/or the urban informal sector 
receive lower wages than in the private sector – and they do not have pensions. 
 




















































































































Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
There are also important variations across sectors in terms of the internal rates of return 
on investments on different levels of education.  Higher education for instance, is better 
valued in the public sector (Figure 10).  Secondary education with a technical diploma 
from a vocational training institution is highly valued in the private sector.  In the 
informal sector, on the other hand, the highest rates of return are for investments in 9 
years of basic education plus a technical diploma from a vocational training institution.  
In all sectors, investments in only primary education or primary education plus a 
technical diploma are not worth much.  These investments are important, only as that 
they allow individuals to access higher educational levels. 
 
 
  19Figure 10:  Internal Rates of Return on Investment in Education by Economic Sector 
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What are the incentives for individuals to queue for jobs in the civil service?  To answer 
this question we compute equation (15) for a 25 year old-individual having to decide 
whether to take a job in the private sector at time ‘t’, or wait for a job in the public sector 
that can occur with probability ‘p’. We simulate four values for p: 1%, 5%, 10% and 
20%.  We also assume that if the individual does not work he/she has to borrow an 
amount equivalent to 50% of the salary paid by the private sector job.  The net gains from 
waiting for the public sector job are graphed in the left panel of Figure 11.  Each line 
corresponds to one value of ‘p’.  We observe that even in the case of a very low 
probability of finding a public sector job, the individual has an incentive to wait for one 
year.  If the probability of finding a job is 10% then the individual would have incentives 
to wait for 8 years.  If the probability is 20% then the individual would have incentives to 
wait for 12 years.  With no borrowing needs (b=0) even with a 2% probability of finding 
a job in the public sector the individual would have incentives to wait for 10 years (see 
dotted line). 
 





































































































Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
How much of the incentive to delay taking the job in the private sector is explained by 
the pension system?  To answer this question we calculate equation (15) assuming that 
pensions in the civil service respond to the same rules as pensions in the private sector.  
We then compare the resulting ngw(.) functions.  The percentage differences between the 
net gains of waiting at different ages are graphed in the right panel of Figure 11.  The 
results show that differences in the pension system have strong effects around the age 
where waiting is no longer optimal.  Depending on the probability of finding a job in the 
public sector, differences in pensions can increase by 10 to 40% of the net gain of waiting 
and therefore provide strong incentives to let the job in the private sector pass.  Similarly, 
pensions can reduce by 10 to 30% the loss from waiting and also contribute to queuing.   
 
The final question that we address is what are the incentives to switch from a public 
sector to a private sector job?  We do this analysis for an individual with higher education 
considering the possibility of switching at various ages.  The relevant measure in this 
case is the change in the financial wealth, which is the present value of future wages and 
pensions.  The results are presented in Figure 12.  Not surprisingly our calculations show 
that individuals switching would face important losses; the financial wealth would be 
reduced by 46% to 48%. 
 
Most of the losses in financial wealth are of course attributable to lower salaries in the 
private sector.  A sizable part of the losses, however, is also explained by the move to a 
less generous pension system.  Hence, the change in pension system reduces the financial 
wealth by between 5% and 15% depending on the age of the switching.  The longer the 
individual waits, and therefore the higher the expected pensions are, the higher the loss 
(see dotted line in Figure 12).  
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This section has analyzed incentives for labor mobility across main economic sectors.  
The analysis is based on the analysis of career paths and the calculation of three 
indicators:  internal rates of return on education, net gains from queuing for jobs in the 
public sector, and the change in wealth resulting from switching jobs across sectors.   
These indicators can be easily computed on the basis of labor force or household survey 
data.  When applied to Morocco the indicators show that a fragmented pension system 
distorts rates of return on education, reduces incentives to supply labor in the private 
sector, and discourages mobility between the public and private sectors.  The corollary is 
that pension reforms that unify the pension system can contribute to facilitating labor 







There is ample evidence of distortions that pension systems can impose on labor markets 
by influencing the decision of whether to retire and become inactive; and whether to 
supply labor in the public, formal private, or informal sectors. Typical defined benefit 
pension system designs (lacking actuarial connection between contributions and benefits) 
constitute an especially high risk for labor market distortions since they tend to offer 
variable internal rates of return at various ages, and if the pension system is fragmented, 
they tend to offer different returns across sectors as well. 
 
The standard indicators used to assess incentive problems are the internal rate of return 
(IRR) on contributions as a function of the retirement age and the change in pension 
wealth at a given retirement age. These indicators, however, do not capture the tradeoffs 
between consumption and leisure, which are at the core of the retirement decision, and 
they also ignore the interplay between benefit formulas, eligibility conditions and the 
individuals’ attitude towards risk. This is why we proposed a complementary indicator - 
  22the normative estimator of the probability of early retirement based on utility maps.  This 
indicator takes into account the tradeoff between consumption and leisure as well as the 
heterogeneity of preferences of individuals. We then used the indicator to assess the 
incentives problems in Morocco, a fairly representative country for the middle-income 
group. We showed that incentives for early retirement are important, particularly in the 
national scheme.  Using a model that projects the labor force by age, gender, and skills 
level we also showed that changes in labor force participation rates resulting from 
pension policies that affect retirement decisions can have important effects on human 
capital accumulation.  Potentially, on average, in the period 2006-2040, corrected early 
retirement incentives could increase the human capital growth rate by approximately 2 
percent under conceivable stylized scenarios.  We find this impact quite significant in 
light of current pension reform discussion/decision-making practices that fail to quantify 
this broader economic implication.  
 
Subsequently, we conducted an analysis based on micro simulations of career paths for 
individuals with different levels of education working in different economic sectors – and 
therefore belonging to different pension plans. We focused on three indicators:  internal 
rates of return on education, net gains from queuing for jobs in the public sector, and the 
change in wealth resulting from switching jobs across sectors.  When applied to Morocco 
the indicators showed that a fragmented pension system distorts rates of return on 
education, reduces incentives to supply labor in the private sector, and discourages 
mobility between the public and private sectors.  The corollary is that pension reforms 
that unify the pension system can contribute to facilitating labor mobility across sectors 
and therefore to facilitating economic restructuring and improved efficiency. 
 
There are both methodological and policy conclusions from our paper. Regarding the 
methodology, we believe that future assessments of pension institutions and international 
comparisons of the effects of benefit formulas and eligibility conditions on retirement 
decisions could benefit from the calculation of the normative estimator of the probability 
of early retirement based on the utility maps. The indicator is useful to assess, ex-ante, 
the potential impact that policy changes can have on retirement decisions. In addition, we 
believe that a complex analysis of the consequences of early retirement go beyond the 
narrow assessment of the impact on the financial sustainability of the pension scheme, it 
should even go beyond assessing the consolidated fiscal impact and it should address the 
impact of early retirement on the evolution of human capital. The methodology described 
in this paper using the gender, age and educational attainment specific projection of the 
labor force and the associated measure of human capital is a suitable framework for the 
analysis of how early retirement affects the evolution of productive capacities in the 
economy. 
 
Regarding policies, the paper strengthens the argument for the existence of significant 
economic benefits of reforms that reduce incentives for early retirement, and eliminate 
differences in benefit formulas and eligibility conditions for different segments of the 
labor force. While those benefits have been pointed out in the literature, there are still a 
significant number of policy-makers in high- and middle-income countries that consider 
them exaggerated, especially when compared to the political costs of introducing pension 
  23reforms. Our paper will hopefully contribute to some reassessment of the cost-benefit 
analysis of pension reforms, by showing that the benefits may have been so far 
underestimated.  
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